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Touch as a sense of force 
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Colour is the special object of sight, sound of hearing, 
flavour of taste. […] 
Nevertheless, we are unable clearly to detect in the case 
of touch what the single subject is which corresponds to 
sound in the case of hearing.” Aristote, De Anima. 
 
 
“[Touch] might be considered to be essentially a sense of 
force.” Ernst Heinrich Weber, Der Tastsinn. 
 
 
Abstract. The aim of this paper is to give a description of the objects of the sense of touch. Those 
objects, it is argued, are forces, rather than flesh deformation, solidity or weight. Tangible forces, 
basically tensions and pressures, are construed as symmetric and non-spatially reducible causal 
relations. Two consequences are drawn: first, the perception of heat and cold falls outside the sense of 
touch; second, muscular sense (together with a large part of proprioception) falls inside the sense of 
touch. 
 
Each sense modality has a proper object, that is, a kind of entity that we cannot 
(directly) perceive by any other modality1. Colours are the proper objects of sight and sounds 
are the proper objects of hearing. Of course, there is a sense in which we can see that someone 
is screaming, but arguably this is only indirect perception: we see the scream by seeing the 
expression of the face, and we see the expression of the face by seeing its different colours. At 
the most direct level of perception, sounds can only be heard and colours can only be seen. 
Moreover, these proper objects are what individuates sensory modalities: sight is the 
perception of colours, and hearing is the perception of sounds. I shall assume this broadly 
Aristotelian picture according to which (i) there is a distinction between direct and indirect 
perception2 (ii) there is a distinction between proper and common sensibles or objects (such as 
colours and sounds and the one hand and shape and other spatial properties on the other hand)  
(iii) sensory modalities are individuated by their proper sensibles. The question I address is 
                                                 
1 I use the term object in a very generic sense in which qualities and events such as colours, sounds or flavours 
qualifies as objects (as opposed to a more specific sense of “object”, which refers to tri-dimensional hunk of 
matter). 
2 or between kath’auto and accidental perception in Aristotle’s terminology. 
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the following: what are the proper objects of the sense of touch? Contrary to what happens 
with sight or hearing, this question has no spontaneous or uncontroversial answer. 
Nevertheless, I will argue that forces are the basic tangible properties.  
But since the third claim about sensory individuation has became highly controversial, 
let me first say  a few words about it. First, a clarification: by “proper object” I mean the 
intentional objects of perceptual experiences, tactual phenomena or appearances: these 
intentional objects are what is subjectively perceived3. My aim here is to give a 
phenomenological description of the objects of tactile perception. The description intended is 
phenomenological in the sense that it tries to describe how the objects of touch appear to the 
subject of these experiences, independently of any ontological decision about their real nature 
(whether they are physical or not for example). Therefore, this description of appearances is 
only a part of the story, since the ontological work has yet to be done. I believe that felt forces 
and physical forces shared all their properties so that they are very plausibly identical4. But 
since I won’t try to characterise physical forces here, I won’t be able to reach this conclusion. 
Second, the claim that proper objects individuate sensory modalities has been 
challenged by H.P. Grice (1989 [1962]), who claims that such a solution cannot account for 
the distinction between seeing or feeling (tactually) a certain spatial property such as the 
shape of a penny. There is a difference between feeling the roundness of the penny and seeing 
it, though in both cases, we perceive the same property, namely roundness. So the 
phenomenal difference between these two experiences can’t be explained by a difference in 
their intentional objects. The very existence of common sensibles and of a distinction between 
perceiving them through different sensory modalities implies that senses can’t be individuated 
by proper sensibles. Ironically, the good answer to this objection is advanced by Grice 
himself: in substance, the relation between shape and colour, or between shape and the proper 
object of touch is not one of mere conjunction but one of dependence5: one can’t see a shape 
                                                 
3 Notoriously, this raises a methodological problem: what if someone’s argue that, in the same circumstances, he 
doesn’t feel forces, but weights, solid objects, movements in its body or even sounds? The appeal to the inner 
experience of the subject reach a deadlock, or so it seems. Nevertheless, I take it that descriptive psychology, the 
description of our inner experience and its objects, is methodologically problematic but not desperate. We cannot 
prove that objects of consciousness are Fs rather than Gs, but we can at least give good reasons in favour of Fs 
rather than Gs. I follow Brentano’s optimism: in case of disagreement between two subjects concerning their 
phenomenal reports, each can reasonably hope to convince the other that he’s made an error of observation, for 
example, that he has mixed up what is directly experienced with what is inferred (Psychology: 200). We have to 
be confident in the fact that some phenomenological descriptions are closer to the truth than others. 
4 I’m here following Evan Fales (1990: 16) and David Armstrong (1997: 213). 
5 A similar view of the relations between between (proper) qualities and space has been developed by Austen 
Clark in his book A Theory of Sentience, where here argues that this relation must be more than mere 
conjunction (see especially chap. 2). I think that the story is indeed a little more complex that the one he suggests 
since we have to distinguish between spatial particulars (such as places) and spatial properties (such as shapes). 
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without seeing a colour; and one can’t feel a shape without feeling a tangible quality, 
whatever it is. So whether a given shape is seen or felt is determined by the proper sensible on 
which it depends: it is seen if it depends on a colour; and it is felt if it depends on a tangible 
quality. To put it another way: if the shape is coloured, it is seen ; and if it is, say, pressing, it 
is felt. If it is both coloured and pressing, it is seen and felt. 
 
I come now to my main point, namely, that forces are the proper objects of the sense 
of touch. In the first part, I give a description of phenomenal forces according to which they 
are non-spatially reducible symmetrical relations between our body and the world. In the 
second part I reject three rival answers that claim that the proper and primary objects of the 
sense of touch are rather spatial properties, solidity or weight. In the third part I draw some 
consequences of the force hypothesis concerning the extension of tactile sense: on the one 
hand, the perception of heat no more falls into the sense of touch. It becomes a sui generis 
sense of thermoception, whose object is temperature. One the other hand, muscle sense, which 
is essential for proprioception, now falls into the sense of touch, widely conceived as a sense 
of force. 
 
 il faut inverser et commencer par la deuxième partie : les autres candidates. 
1. Description of felt forces 
 
 1.1. Felt forces 
 
 When someone gives you a little tap on the back, you feel a pressure on your skin. 
When your heft a melon, you feel a pressure on your skin but you feel also a tension in your 
muscles. Pressure and tensions are the two kinds of forces that we perceive by touch. How are 
we to describe them? These felt forces have seven characteristics6: 
 
(i) The first point to be noted is that felt forces are relations. Forces are felt as 
connecting two entities at least: something is pressing on something else; something is pulling 
                                                 
Spatial properties and proper qualities (colours, sounds…) are in a relation of mutual and generic dependence: 
everything that has a colour must have a shape, whatever it is, and everything that has a shape must have a 
colour, whatever it is. A coloured-shape is a complex property that is in turn generically dependent on a place: 
every coloured-shaped property require a place, but not every places are exemplify (or are occupied by) a 
coloured-shaped property. 
 
6 I take up characteristics (iii) and (iv) from Evan Fales, Causation and Universals, 1990. 
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on something else. We feel the pressure of the melon on our flesh, that is, a relation between 
these two entities. One term of these force-relations at least must be a part of our body. The 
other term may be an entity external to our body or another part of our body. 
 
(ii) Felt forces aren’t spatially reducible: pressure is something else than mere contact 
or flesh deformation. Forces are dynamic properties (together with mass, weight, inertia…), as 
opposed to kinematic ones (such as motion, momentum, velocity). (I shall come back to this 
issue in the third section).  
 
(iii) Although not spatially reducible, felt forces are located, most often somewhere in 
our body. In case of a cutaneous stimulation, this location —the point (or surface) of 
application of the force— is at the point (or surface) of contact between the external stimulus 
and the body. In case of muscular exertion, this location is felt somewhere in the muscle. 
 
(iv) Felt forces have a magnitude: the pressure of a pen on our thumb can be more or 
less intense. 
 
(v) Felt forces have a line of action: there is a line along which they exert. When we 
heft a melon, this line, for cutaneous impression, is vertical. When we push a chess piece, it is 
horizontal (for cutaneous sensations again). 
 
(vi) Felt forces have a pole: they are either pressure forces, either tension forces. If you 
pinch you ear lobe with a clothes peg, you experiment a pressure. If someone pulls your hairs, 
you experiment a tension (possibly painful). It may be that muscular felt forces are always 
tensions. 
 
(vii) Felt forces are symmetrical relations: the pressure that the melon is felt to exert on 
our hand isn’t different from the pressure that our hand is felt to exert on the melon. This 
claim may sound odd because we intuitively distinguish between active forces (the forces that 
we exert) and passive ones (the forces that are exerted on us).  
 
 
This leads Evans Fales (1990:17), to the conclusion that felt forces are asymmetric 
relations. The problem with this view is that the distinction between active and passive forces 
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only point to extrinsic properties of those forces. By themselves, forces are symmetrical: it is 
only their volitional and their cinematic context that determine that active or passive 
character. Take the example of someone’s being punched in the nose. It is clear that to be 
punched is not the same thing as to punch. But does this difference appear at the level of 
cutaneous and muscular sensations? I don’t think so. There seems to be two reasons why we 
distinguish the two: the first it that to punch is an intentional or voluntary act, whereas to be 
punched is not something that we do but something that happens to us. That is, active forces 
are preceded by a volition or an intention. Clearly, this isn’t an intrinsic properties of the felt 
force: the very same pattern of pressure on the skin may be perceived, whether it results from 
a voluntary action or from an external impingement. One may replies that such an answer 
only works for the cutaneous sensation: as soon as muscular sensations are involved, it seems 
clear that the feeling of effort is an intrinsic property of the felt force, which is then 
asymmetric. But here again, it is not clear at all that the feeling of effort is intrinsic to the 
muscular felt force. It is rather an accompanying feeling of this force, to take up the 
expression of Brentano. You can hear a sound that causes you some pleasure, but the pleasure 
is not part of the sound you hear. Likewise, a muscular tension may cause a feeling of effort, 
but the effort is not part of the perceived force. Actually we sometimes experiment muscular 
forces that are not effortful: for example when a muscle spontaneously contract when we have 
cramp (then the accompanying feeling is painful, but not effortful) or when it is artificially 
excited. This shows that we can experiment muscular forces without experimenting them as 
active forces, that is, as force that we voluntarily exert. 
 
Besides the volitional context of a felt forces, the cinematic context in which it is 
perceived also determine their active or passive status. The last thing that has moved tend to 
be considered as the one that has acted. Thus, in order to punch, we have to move, but not in 
order to be punched. The forces resulting of a movement tend to be considered as active ones. 
 
By themselves, forces are symmetrical: it is only their volitional and their cinematic 
context that determine their active or passive character. If we put aside these extrinsic 
features, there is no phenomenal difference between being punched in the nose and 
deliberately hitting a fist with its nose. The patterns of pressures and tensions felt in the skin 
and in the muscle may be exactly the same. Hence, they are no good reasons to consider felt 
forces as asymmetrical. Moreover, there is a good reason to consider them as symmetrical: for 
each cutaneous and muscular experience, we can give two equally acceptable descriptions. 
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We can describe them either as the force a exerts on b, or as the force b exerts on a. From the 
strict point of view of what is felt, we have no reason to prefer one description to the other. 
For example, when you push against a wall, are you experiencing the force you are exerting 
on it, or the force it’s exerting on you (which is the resistance of the wall)? These two reports 
seem equally acceptable. Similarly, when you heft a melon, the force you feel is as well your 
muscular tension than its weight. Felt force have no direction, but have only a pole: they are 
tension or pressure, attraction or repulsion. So felt forces are symmetrical relations.  
 
To sum up, felt forces are non-spatially reducible and symmetrical relations. These 
relations have a location, a pole, a magnitude and a line of action. Before considering some 
competing accounts of the intentional objects of muscular and cutaneous experiences, I turn 
now to what seems to me to be the most important objection against the present account. 
 
  1.2. Are we really perceiving three entities at once? 
 
According to this objection, such a relational description of the tangibilia leads to an 
extravagant phenomenology of touch. The argument runs as follows: 
 
(i) We cannot perceive a relation without perceiving its terms. Following the present 
account, this implies that each tactile experience as a threefold object: the force 
relation and its two relata. 
 
 (ii) But whatever the right phenomenology of the sense of touch may be, it is clear that 
we don’t perceive three things at once. What we feel is quite simple. 
 
∴ Hence, the force relation, if it exists, cannot be felt: we can perceive only its terms. 
either the external ones or the internal ones. At best, the force is an unperceived 
mediator between us and the world.  
 
It is well worth noting that this conclusion is strongly humean: we cannot perceive the causal 
relation itself, but only the cause or the effect7.  
 
                                                 
7 John Bigelow, Brian Ellis and Robert Pargetter (1986: 615-6) take this conclusion to be the orthodox position 
concerning the perception of forces: “[According to the standard picture]We feel the surges and other distortions 
which are caused by gravitational force, but not the force itself. Likewise, we feel the body that touches us, not 
the forces which mediates between that body and ours. […] So we have two competing accounts of our 
experiences: (1) that we do experience forces directly, and (2) that a force is just that which mediates between 
our experience, and the objects and properties that we experience. It is now fairly standard to accept the second 
of these stories, though we find it difficult to find compelling reasons which favor this story, or even to find a 
completely satisfactory explanation for its common acceptance”. 
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I agree with the first point: if we were to perceive a relation without its terms, then we 
would not perceive a relation as such. But I think the second point is mistaken: it is not clear 
at all that the phenomenology of touch is simple in the sense in which we would feel a single 
entity. The simplest way to emphasize this is to point out that our body is always part of our 
tactile experience: each time we feel something external we also feel our body. Now the body 
and the external object are not perceived as mere conjuncts in space and time. There is a 
closer relation between them than contiguity: they stand in a force relation. In other words, we 
are not perceiving a melon just near our hand, but a melon pressing on our hand. So it is true 
that we perceive three things: the melon, our body, and the force relation between them. Felt 
forces are precisely the kind of necessary connection between two felt entities that Hume was 
seeking in vain.  
 
 
2. Rejection of three others answers 
 
 I come now to the examination of three alternative proposals: since there’re all facing 
important objections, this will provide a new reason to adopt forces as primary object of 
touch. I can imagine three concurrent descriptions of the proper objects of touch. The first 
claims that kinematic (or spatial) properties, rather than dynamical ones, are the proper 
objects of the sense of touch. Tangible objects would be spatially reducible. The two other 
proposals agree at first sight that tangible object aren’t spatially reducible, but claim that they 




 2.1 The spatial reduction of the tangibilia 
 
David Armstrong, who has rejected this position since then, has advanced the idea of a 
spatial reduction of the primary objects of touch. “All the tangible qualities, he wrote, reduce 
to spatial properties of objects” (1962: 21)8. Perceiving pressure, according to Armstrong, is 
nothing more than perceiving a spatial change of our body (such as the distortion of our 
flesh). Two objections may be raised against this conception. 
                                                 
8 see A Materialist Theory of the Mind, p. 98). 
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Armstrong himself formulated the first one: what are the demarcators of the spatial 
properties we tactually perceive? In order to see spatial properties such as shape, size or 
motion, we need to see some qualitative property such as colour. Spatial discrimination 
strongly depends on the perception of qualitative difference: to see a shape requires to see 
some contrast between colours. But if spatial properties are the proper objects of touch, there 
is no quality that allows us to demarcate them. After some aborted attempts, Armstrong 
comes to the conclusion that we must accept that contrary to what happens with sight, there is 
no demarcator, or secondary quality, associated with touch. This honest conclusion seems 
however difficult to accept: how can I feel the shape of nothing? It is to be doubted whether 
we can discriminate two places or two shapes if both are equally bare. Moreover, this 
introduces a gap between touch and other sense modalities, which we may want to avoid. 
These difficulties disappear if we admit the force hypothesis: we discriminate places where 
forces are felt from places where no forces are felt. We feel pattern of pressure on our skin, 
what we may call shapes of forces.  
 
Recent psychological studies have stressed the importance of force cues in the haptic 
perception of spatial properties. Robles-de-la-Torre & Hayward (2001) have shown that when 
geometrical cues conflict forces cues, the shape is perceived accordingly to the forces cues. 
Wydoodt & Gentaz, (forthcoming) show that the haptic perception of length is influenced by 
the presence of opposition force or traction force during the exploration. Likewise, the works 
of the gibsonian psychologists M. T. Turvey and C. Carello on “dynamic touch” show that the 
perception of the length of an object through wielding depend on the extraction of dynamic 
properties.  All these works clearly underlines the importance of the dynamical properties 
such as forces in the understanding of touch. They make it clear that the perception of spatial 
properties is highly dependent on the perception of forces.  
 
The second objection against the spatial reduction of tangibilia can be found in 
Moreland Perkins (1983). Perkins endorses the present thesis, according to which proper 
objects of touch are pressures. His argument is that feeling pressure cannot be reduced to 




When a portion of our body reaches a position of static equilibrium with some object 
pressing steadily against it, we continue to feel the pressure of the external object (and 
the internal stress of our flesh) after the motion of the object inward on our flesh and 
the resultant motion of our flesh have stopped. So we can feel pressure by touch 
without perceiving motion. (Perkins, 1983 : 248) 
 
The same kind of example can be presented in case of the muscular forces. Imagine 
two equally strong people arm wrestling against each other. By hypothesis, at the time they 
begin their efforts, nothing moves. And yet both feel something new: if not a force, what 
could it be? Hence, felt forces are not spatially reducible9.  
 
 
 2.2. Solidity 
 
The second competing description of the proper objects of touch says that they are 
instances of solidity, rather than forces. But solidity is an ambiguous concept that means 
either hardness, or impenetrability. Hardness, in the Lockean sense, is a spatial notion: x is 
hard if and only if it doesn’t easily change its shape. So the above argument against spatial 
reduction of felt forces also applies to hardness. In the second sense, solidity means 
impenetrability. An entity is impenetrable if no other entity can occupy the place that it 
occupies at the same time. There are two main difficulties with impenetrability being the 
proper object of touch. First, impenetrability seems too strong. There are entities which are 
penetrable but that we can feel. Think of the field around a magnet that we can feel when 
playing with a metal object. This field is felt, but is not impenetrable: is we exert a sufficient 
force, we can go though and reach the magnet with the metal object. Second, impenetrability 
is a disposition. The manifestation of this disposition is either the motion of the impenetrable 
entity (for instance when we plunge our hand in the water), or the resistance of the 
impenetrable entity to any motion (for instance when we push against a wall).   
 Arguably, we can perceive only the manifestation of disposition.  
 
                                                 
9 Any other attempts to reduce spatial force would have to face these two objections. Notably, contact is 
sometimes held to be the proper object of touch. But contact is a spatial notion (two entities are in contact when 
there is no distance between them), so this won’t do. 
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In this case, solidity is a dispositional notion that only means “able to exert a force”, 
or, more precisely “able to enter into a force relation”. Thus Locke defines it in term of felt 
resistance10. The claim that we feel impenetrability 
 
It follows that impenetrability is derived from forces, which, phenomenally, are the 
primitive entities. Perception of impenetrability depends on perception of forces.  
 
 2.3. Weight 
 
 The third competing account claims that weights are the proper and primary object of 
touch. This suggestion raises two problems. 
 
 First, from a physical point of view, the weight of an object is nothing else that the 
gravitational force that acts on it. So weights cannot replace forces because weights are 
forces.  Second, insofar as weight are forces, they may be considered as proper objects of the 
sense of touch. Nevertheless, it is essential to realize that the weights can’t be the primary 
object of touch, that is, the most primitive entities that we perceive by touch. The first reason 
for this is that we perceive other forces that the gravitational ones. The second and main 
reason is that on earth, the gravitational force being constant, the weight of an object is also 
constant. But our most basic cutaneous and muscular feelings are continuously varying. When 
we heft a melon, the pattern of pressure that we feel on our skin and the tensions that we feel 
in our muscles are far from constant11. Then weight, as a constant property of and object, isn’t 
the primary and direct object of these experiences. Rather, it is a higher-level invariant 
property that is extracted or inferred from varying patterns of pressure and tension on the skin 
and in our muscles12. 
 
  The analogy with sight is here straightforward: there is also a primary or proximal 
level of seeing where we see the colours as constantly varying, where the snow appears tinged 
with different shades of grey. This proximal level is the one that interests what Plato called 
                                                 
10 Essay concerning human understanding, II, iv, 1 ; II, iv, 5. 
11 When we heft a melon, there is a “proximal” mode of perception in which the pressure on our skin and the 
tension in our muscles is constantly varying. But there is also a “distal” mode of perception, of higher level, in 
which the force that the melon exerts on our body is perceived as constant. This invariant force, extract from the 
proximal forces, is what we call weight. 
12 E. L. Amazeen and M.T. Turvey (1996) claim that the invariant that allows the perception of the weight of an 
object is its inertia tensor. 
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the arts of “likeness-making”, like painting or, more recently, the production of haptic 
displays for virtual reality (imagine you have to build a virtual melon: you have to stimulate 
an extremely varying pattern of pressures and tension on the body). Colour constancy, like 
weight, only appears at a higher or distal level. Though I’ve been here concerned exclusively 
with the primary or proximal level of cutaneous and muscular perception, I don’t want to 
suggest that this level is the most salient in cognition. On the contrary, it seems that attention 
spontaneously focuses on the distal level of perception, where we find constant properties and 
maybe where objects, here in the sense of bodies, appear. It may require an effort to focus on 
the proximal level, but the point is that it is possible: the proximal level of perception is 
phenomenally accessible. 
 
  To sum up, neither barely spatial properties, nor solidity, nor weight are likely to be 
the objects of our cutaneous and muscular experiences. The proper and primary objects of the 





 3. Proprioception as part of the tactile sense 
 
 What are the implications of all this concerning the extension of tactile sense? On the 
one hand, touch is deprived of the perception of heat and cold. It seems clear that 
temperatures are not (experienced as) forces. We must then admit a special sense dedicated to 
the perception of hot and cold. The reason why this sense of temperature has often been 
confounded with the sense of touch13 is probably that temperatures and forces are often felt at 
the same places. If thermoreceptors and mecanoreceptors had been located at different places, 
we would have made the distinction between touch and thermoperception (I borrow this term 
from Perkins). On the contrary, if the chemical receptors associated with smell had been 
located in the skin, we would probably have confounded touch and smell. 
 
On the other hand, if touch is a sense of force, then it is enriched with muscle sense. 
                                                 
13 E. H. Weber (1905) and M. Perkins (1983) are significant exceptions. 
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Muscle sense, I take it, informs us about the tensions of our muscles14. Tensions are forces, so 
muscle sense is a part of tactile sense. The importance of muscle sense in proprioception has 
been ignored for a long time. Proprioception was held to be essentially a matter of 
trigonometric calculations: joint receptors, rather than muscular ones, were thought to be at its 
core. But recent works have shown that actually muscle sense is more important than “joint 
sense” for proprioception15. So it seems that proprioception is to a great (if not full) extent a 
matter of force perception. 
 
The works of the gibsonian psychologists M. T. Turvey and C. Carello on “dynamic 
touch” can easily be called for the thesis that touch is essentially a detection of dynamical 
properties and that there are no essential differences between touch and proprioception. “The  
understanding of dynamic touch, they write, may apply not only to how one perceives 
“attachments to the skin”, such as tools and instruments and the hand’s relation to them, but 
also to the very traditional concern of how one perceives the body itself” (1995: 440). 
Whether we touch an object (by wielding it for detecting its length) or detect the position of 
our arms, we are always extracting a same invariant. This invariant, according to Turvey & 
Carello, is an inertia tensor. Very grossly, an inertia tensor is a matrix that represents the 
rotational inertia of an object (or part of the body) around three perpendicular axes. The 
resistance of rotation of an object around one axe is called his moment of inertia. His inertia 
tensor is a symmetric matrix that captures the moments of inertia of the object around three of 
his axes16.  It is a physical invariant. Actually, Turvey and Carello’s work doesn’t concern 
cutaneous touch, but only dynamic touch —defined as the use of the muscle sense in the 
detection of properties of external objects. So this research only gives reason to identify 
proprioception with dynamic touch. But since proprioception, dynamic touch, and cutaneous 
touch are all concerned with the perception of dynamical properties, it seems justified to take 
                                                 
14 The term “muscular sense” seems to have made its apparition around 1820 in the works of Charles Bell (1826) 
and Maine de Biran (2001—1812). Bell was wondering if this sense was presenting us with the tension of the 
muscles or with the degree of effort that our will was exerting on them. Maine de Biran was also distinguishing 
between the passive muscular sensation and the “central spring”, the will, which we know by an “intimate 
feeling” . But whereas Bell finally inclined toward the peripheralist solution (we feel the tension of our muscle), 
Maine de Biran stressed the importance of the centralist thesis: we feel above all the force of our will. Müller and 
Wundt come round to the centralist position. William James defended a pure peripheralist one. Here I take it that 
James view was correct in that the muscle sense is purely centripetal (precisely because it is a sense) but I 
consider the existence of an acquaintance with the force of our will, what Müller called the “innervation 
sensation”, as an open question. (For a very useful presentation of the still alive debate between peripheralists 
and centralists, see Jeannerod 1996, 2002).  
15 The reappraisal of muscular informations for proprioception began with the word of Goodwin, McCloskey and 
Matthews (1972); and Matthews and Simmons (1974). For a presentation of this come-back of the muscle sense, 
see Turvey (1995). 
16 For a clear presentation, see Turvey & Carello (2000). 
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the plunge and to consider them as species of the genus “sense of touch”. I shall now address 
two objections against this hypothesis.  
 
 
Nevertheless there is an important objection against the of proprioception by touch. It 
points out that proprioception is supposed to be a sense of ownership of our body. If we 
identify it with touch, we face a dilemma: either we are committed to the view that our body 
is only presented to us as a part of the external world; either we have to say that external 
objects are presented as belonging to our body. The first horn of this dilemma would have 
seem quite acceptable to Bertrand Russell : “the subject’s body is as distinct from the subject 
as tables and chairs are, and is in fact merely a part of the material world” (1925:152). As far 
as proprioception is concerned, I agree. I don’t deny that there is a crucial difference between 
our body and the external world. But I don’t understand why the perception of the position 
and movement of this body should make it appear as ours. Proprioception seems to have too 
many irons on the fire: it is supposed to inform us upon the forces and movements of our 
body as well as to explain the ownership of this body. This is too much for a single sense. Our 
own body is better defined in a Cartesian (or Lockean way) as the sum of all the places where 
we can feel bodily qualia such as pain, pleasures, itches or tickles (these experiences may 
have intentional objects —and these objects may sometimes be forces—, but their objects, I 
assume, don’t exhaust their phenomenal character). A second, maybe more fundamental way 
to define our proper body, is to say that it is everything on which our intentions or volitions 
are directly efficient. Once we free proprioception from the difficult task of explaining 
ownership, it becomes easier to identifying it with touch. 
 
  Conclusion 
 
I hope to have shown that forces, rather than solidity, weight or spatial properties are 
the proper and primary objects of the sense of touch. This leads us to a second question, 
which I only mention here, concerning the ontological nature of those phenomenal forces. Is it 
possible to identify phenomenal forces with physical ones? In other word, are phenomenal 
forces real? Following Fales (1990) , Newman (1992), Bigelow, Ellis, Pargetter (1996) and 
Armstrong (1997) I suggest that the answer is positive: phenomenal forces, construe as non-
spatially reducible symmetrical relations share all their characteristics with physical ones 
(including symmetry, see Newman, 1992). Then, arguably, felt forces are physical forces. 
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This has an interesting consequence regarding the specificity of the sense of touch. 
Following Hume, many philosopher have claimed that causation cannot be perceived. 
Nevertheless, since physical forces may plausibly be count as causal relation, we may directly 
perceive phyical causation by touch. Hume might be right in the case of sight: visual world is 
a purely cinematic, spatial one. But he’s wrong in the case of touch: the world of touch is a 
dynamic, causal one. 
, I want to mention two consequences of this definition of touch as a sense of force. 
The first one concerns causation. Since Hume (and Berkeley), it has been widely accepted 
that causation cannot be perceived17. This has lead to many attempts to redefine causation (in 
terms of counterfactual dependence, transference, transmission, process, manipulability, 
probability etc.). But, if forces are actually experimented, there are good reasons to consider 
causation as a phenomenally and ontologically primitive entity18. Identification of causation 
with forces has interesting consequences. Since forces are symmetrical relations, this implies 
that the notion of a direction of production is not intrinsic to causation. Nothing is intrinsically 
a cause or an effect: this may depend on volitional or kinematic context (what is perceived to 
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